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BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY:
THE NEW PATH OF DETERRENCE
Dan M. Kahan*
The explosive collision of economics and sociology has long illu
minated the landscape of deterrence theory. It is a debate as hope
less as it is spectacular.
Economics is practical but thin. Starting from the simple prem
ise that individuals rationally maximize their utility, economics gen
erates a robust schedule of prescriptions - from the appropriate
size of criminal penalties,1 to the optimal form of criminal punish
ments,2 to the most efficient mix of private and public investments
in deterrence.3 Yet it is the very economy of economics that ulti
mately subverts it: its account of human motivations is too simplis
tic to be believable, and it generates policies too severe to be just.
Sociology is rich but impractical. Absorbing all the complexity
of the world as it is, it supplies breathtakingly elaborate accounts of
why individuals turn to crime - from the criminogenic properties
of poverty to the self-reinforcing culture of criminality.4 But this
elaborate account yields little usable policy guidance; by now it's
clear that our society has neither the political will nor the social
scientific know-how to eradicate the "root causes" of crime.
What's needed is a third way, one that combines the virtues of
both economics and sociology without succumbing to the vices of
either. If such an approach cannot be fashioned, the idea of deter
rence might continue to function as a politically charged creed or as
an absorbing focus for abstract formal models, but it will cease to
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D.
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to the Russell J. Parsons Fund and the Jerome S. Weiss
Fund for Faculty Research at the University of Chicago Law School for generous financial
support, and to Neal Katya! for comments.
1. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 16 J. Por..
EcoN. 169, 191-93 (1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Por..
ECON. 526, 530-31 (1970).
2. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30
EcoN. INQUIRY 583 (1992); Joel Waldfogel, Are F ines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently?
Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders, 38 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Hare!, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for
Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 434 (1995); Keith N. Hylton, Opti
mal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. EcoN. 197 (1996).
4. See generally RUTH RosNER KORNHAUS ER, SocIAL SOURCES OF DEUNOUENCY: AN
APPRAISAL OF ANALYTIC MODELS 21-50 (1978) (surveying the sociological theories of
delinquency).
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furnish a practical framework for solving America's crime problem
on morally acceptable terms.
My goal in this essay is to call attention to an emerging body of
criminal-law scholarship that I believe has the potential to chart a
new course between sociology and economics. These works seek to
enrich the standard economic conception of deterrence through at
tention to social norms, a concept that has figured prominently in
other fields of law.5 Although they employ a diverse array of terms
- from "social organization,"6 to "moral credibility,"7 to "social
meaning,"8 to "social influence"9 - these works all stress the influ
ence between law and shared values as an important explanation
for the extent of crime.
My primary motive for grouping these works together, however,
is political, not conceptual. By focusing on how law can be used to
regulate norms, the new deterrence scholarship can be used to iden
tify morally acceptable and politically feasible alternatives to the
severe punishments that dominate contemporary criminal law. The
public demand for such punishments stems from deep-seated polit
ical, ideological, and even psychological dynamics.10 Merely criti
cizing the economic theory of crime does nothing to satisfy the
public-opinion forces that generate that conception's "get tough"
brand of deterrence.11 Thus, unlike critiques that are content
merely to show that severe penalties won't work, the new deter
rence scholarship aims to identify policies that will, because of their
positive effect on the social conditions that cause crime. Between
5. The emergence of interest in social norms within the legal academy can be trace
Ellickson. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SEITLE
DISPUTES (1991). Indeed, Ellickson himself examines the connection between norms of or
der and crime in Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996).
6. E.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement passim (July
29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7. E.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COM
MUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 201-02 (1995) [hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert,
91 N w. U. L. REv. 453, 457-58, 477-88, 494-99 (1997) (hereinafter Robinson & Darley, The
Utility of Desert].
8. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 591,
594, 606-30, 650, 653 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm.
L. REv. 943 passim (1995).
9. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 passim (1997); see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crime and Social Interactions, 111 Q.J.
ECON. 507 (1996).
10. See generally Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Crimi
nal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23 (1997) (developing a theory to explain public demand for

excessive severity in criminal law).
11. See generally Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? The Peculiar Place of Ex
perts in the Current Debate About Crime and Justice, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 305 (1995) (criticizing
criminal-justice experts for failing to take account of public sensibilities).
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sociology and economics lies a set of policies - from curfews, to
gang-loitering laws, to order-maintenance policing, to reverse
stings, to shaming penalties - that deter as well as or better than
severe prison terms and that cost much less.
It is against this background that we should understand Neal
Katyal's important article.12 Katyal's insightful account of how the
phenomenon of substitution can confound conventional deterrence
prescriptions employs a host of innovative concepts - including
Giffen goods, income effects, and extremeness aversion - that the
new deterrence scholarship should aspire to appropriate.
But before Katyal's works can be appropriated in this way, his
account must be extended. Katyal's argument is cast primarily in
critical terms; he shows, convincingly, how attempts to obliterate
crime through severe sentences can backfire as offenders substitute
even more harmful offenses. What's missing, however, is a detailed
and believable exposition of how the same dynamic can be used in
reverse to induce offenders to substitute less harmful for more
harmful crimes. Unless they tell us what to do and not just what not
to do, Katyal's arguments will founder on the shoals of political
unacceptability.
Tue remainder of this essay elaborates on the new path of deter
rence and Katyal's significance to it. Part I catalogues the tech
niques and policies that the new deterrence theorists use to
negotiate the space between economics and sociology. Part II ex
amines Katyal's efforts to traverse that space and speculates about
how his core ideas can be used to generate politically feasible policy
prescriptions.
I.

THE NEW PATH: A PRIMER

Tue new deterrence scholarship aims to enrich economics by
identifying social phenomena important enough to .be worth regu
lating but malleable enough to be regulated efficiently. In this Part,
I'll describe four such phenomena: social organization, moral credi
bility, social meaning, and social influence.
A.

Social Organization

Social organization theory posits a relationship between crime
and the strength of social and civic associations.13 Intact families
transmit law-abiding values (primarily through their contribution to
neighborhood life) and instill the discipline that individuals need to
acquire marketable education and experience; broken families pro12. See Neal Katya!, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997).
13. See Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579 (1997);
Meares, supra note 6.
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duce impulsive, antisocial individuals. Vital friendship networks
multiply the opportunities individuals have to find lawful employ
ment; enfeebled networks foreclose such opportunities. Active
civic associations promote trust and a disposition on the part of
neighbors to watch out for one another's interests; an atomized
community life erodes trust and enervates the power of citizens to
protect themselves from predation.14
The criminologists who pioneered this theory viewed social dis
organization as a "root cause" of criminality. Fostering vital social
networks mattered more for combating crime, in their view, than
did fashioning appropriate law-enforcement polices.1s
The recent work of Tracey Meares, however, shows that the al
location of law enforcement resources can determine whether a
community's social organization stock is large or small.16 The result
is a more practical appropriation of this concept for deterrence
theory.
For example, Meares defends curfews and so-called gang
loitering laws based on their contribution to social organization.17
These policies, she argues, increase the relative supervisional au
thority of parents and other adults, who are more likely to transmit
law-abiding values and dispositions to juveniles than are other
juveniles. In addition, these policies (in conjunction with more gen
eralized order-maintenance policing) reduce community residents'
fear of crime, which in turn increases their willingness to join
leagues with others in combating it.
Meares also examines the complex interaction between drug
law enforcement and social organization.1s Drug use diminishes so
cial organization in various ways, from the debilitation of parents to
the production of community fear and distrust. But so do severe
criminal punishments for drug distribution. The staggeringly high
percentage of African-American men who are in penal custody en
tails a staggeringly high percentage of broken families. It also
means the disenfranchisement of a sizable portion of the inner-city
population and a resulting withering of civic life. Finally, it means
the stigmatization of African-American men generally, a social con
dition that diminishes their opportunities to form associations with
law-abiders. In effect, the "get tough" policies used to fight drug
14. See CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN
1969). My account of Shaw and McKay's work is based on Meares's descrip
tion of it. See Meares, supra note 13, at 580; Meares, supra note 6.

AREAs (rev. ed.

15. See SHAW & McKAY, supra note 14, at 170-89.
16. See Meares, supra note 13, at 589-93; Meares, supra note 6, at 43-48.
17. See Meares, supra note 13, at 591-93; Meares, supra note 6, at 53-57.
18. See Meares, supra note 13, at 586-91; Meares, supra note 6.
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use undermine themselves by enfeebling the social structures that
guide individuals away from crime.
Meares's ingenious solution is the "reverse sting."19 Under this
law-enforcement technique, undercover officers pose not as drug
buyers - the usual tactic - but rather as drug sellers. Reverse
stings redirect the social-disorganizing effects of drug-law enforce
ment from the poor, mainly African-American inner-city communi
ties in which dealers reside to the more heterogeneous, often
suburban ones in which buyers reside.20 The latter, because they
are more organized to begin with, suffer relatively little disruption
when certain of their members receive severe punishments. In this
way, society gets the social-organization benefits of drug-law en
forcement without the high social-disorganization costs that usually
attend it.
B.

Moral Credibility

The power of the law to guide conduct turns at least in part on
its moral credibility. Individuals are more inclined to obey particu
lar laws when they believe that the criminal justice system as a
whole accords with their values.21 This insight is at the core of the
work of law professor Paul Robinson and social psychologist John
Darley. Because moral credibility influences compliance, substan
tive law, they argue, ought to conform to the greatest extent possi
ble with the community's moral sensibilities; where there is such
convergence as a general matter, the law will have the goodwill nec
essary to win citizens' obedience in the inevitable cases where the
law diverges from those sensibilities. Robinson and Darley use this
concept, which they call the "utility of desert," to criticize various
policies, including strict liability, regulatory crimes, and dispropor
tionately severe punishments for minor offenses, that seem justifi
able in economic terms but that risk undermining deterrence by
squandering the law's reputation for justice.22
Robinson and Darley's sophisticated empirical work also sug
gests numerous other reforms that can be expected to enhance the
law's moral credibility.23 Their study shows, f or example, that
members of the public generally disapprove of grading unintended
homicides that occur in the course of a felony as severely as inten
tional murder; reducing the grade of such homicides to manslaugh
ter, they conclude, would bring the law more in line with

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Meares, supra note 13, at 593; Meares, supra note 6, at 48-52.
See Meares, supra note 6, at 48-49.
See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 40-68 (1990).
See Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 7, at 480-82.
See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABIUTY, AND BLAME, supra note 7.
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community moral sensibilities.24 Likewise, members of the public
generally oppose punishing attempted offenses as severely as com
pleted ones, a finding at odds with the modem trend reflected in
the Model Penal Code.zs Their work also supports reform in the
definition and grading of statutory rape. In all of these ways and in
others, Robinson and Darley's work shows how less severity can
enhance deterrence once the standard economic view is supple
mented with the concept of moral credibility.
But like the other works that negotiate the space between eco
nomics and sociology, Robinson and Darley's work does more than
criticize excessively severe criminal punishments; it also points the
way to cost-effective and politically feasible alternatives. The per
ception that the law excludes relevant evidence of guilt, Robinson
argues, needlessly compromises the credibility of the law.26 So, too,
do judicial decisions that overturn popular law-enforcement tech
niques - such as public-housing building searches, curfews, and
gang-loitering laws - on the ground that these laws supposedly in
vite harassment of the very citizens who support them;27 although
couched in the rhetoric of civil liberties, decisions such as these
amount to telling residents of the inner city that they don't know
enough or don't care enough about liberty to judge for themselves
what the best trade-off is between liberty and order.2s Constitu
tional doctrine doesn't have to be understood to compel these re
sults; changing it so that it wouldn't, Robinson and Darley's account
implies, would enhance deterrence not just by making the law
tougher on law-breakers, but also by raising the confidence of law
abiders, who would then be more inclined to cooperate with one
another and with authorities to rid their communities of crime.
C.

Social Meaning

Actions have meanings as well as consequences. We interpret
behavior (as well as institutions and laws) against a background of
social norms that define how persons who value particular goods whether the welfare of other persons, their own honor or dignity, or
the beauty of the natural environment - should behave.29 Select
ing actions that effectively express commitment to the goods we
24. See id. at 169-81.
See id. at 14-28.
26. See Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MoNn!LY, Mar. 1995,
at 76.
27. See id.
28. See Tracey Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong (June 1, 1997) (un
published manuscript, on file with author).
29. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181
{1996).
25.
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value is part of being rational.3° A theory of rational choice that
abstracts from meaning - by, say, reducing the value of actions
solely to their production of utility or dollars or, in the case of regu
latory law, lives saved - will generate unreliable predictions and
uncompelling prescriptions.31
Punishment is meaningful. By selecting an affliction of the ap
propriate form and severity, the community expresses condemna
tion of the wrongdoer and reaffirms its commitment to the values
that the wrongdoer's own act denies.32 Because we understand
punishment this way, an insufficiently severe punishment is likely to
be seen as tacitly endorsing the criminal's behavior and devaluing
his or her victim.33 A theory of criminal-law policy that abstracts
from this expressive dimension - by, say, reducing the value of all
punishments solely to their effectiveness in deterring crime or in
flicting deserved suffering - is bound to mislead.
This is the problem with the conventional defense of alternative
sanctions. This account defends the use of fines and community
service for serious but nonviolent crimes on the ground that these
punishments supply essentially the same amount of deterrence as
imprisonment at a substantially smaller cost.34 What this argument
ignores, however, is the varying expressive significances of these
punishments. Imprisonment unmistakably expresses moral indig
nation because of the sacred place of liberty in our culture. The
conventional alternatives, in contrast, send a much more ambiguous
signal. To the ears of the public, fines seem to say that offenders
may buy the privilege of breaking the law; and we can't very well
30. See generally EuZABElH ANDERSON, vALUE IN E1HICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
31. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89
MICH. L. REv. 936 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779, 820·24 {1994).
32. See Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988).
33. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1441 {1988) (concluding that race-of-victim
disparities in the frequency of the death sentence show that "in Georgia's marketplace of
emotion the lives of blacks simply count for less than the lives of whites" (emphasis omit
ted)); Scott Armstrong, Case Against Simpson Intensifies Death-Penalty Debate in US, CHrus..
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 6, 1994, at 2 (reporting the comment of a feminist activist that the
prosecutor's decision on whether to seek the death penalty for O.J. Simpson '"raises the
issue of whether a battered woman's life is as important as a celebrated man's life'"); Judge
Draws Protests After Cutting Sentence of Gay Man's Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at A15
(reporting the comment of a gay activist that the light sentence of a man convicted of man
slaughter for the intentional killing of a homosexual sends the message '"[. .]nb]that it's
O.K. to kill faggots"'). For an extended account of the stake that victims and those who
identify with them have in criminal trials, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, Wrm JUSTICE FOR
SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS {1995).
34. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 90 {1990); Richard A.
Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 410-11
{1980).
.
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condemn someone for purchasing what we are willing to sell.35
Community service also sends a confusing message: we don't con
demn persons who educate the retarded, install smoke detectors in
nursing homes, restore dilapidated low income housing, and the
like; we admire them.36 What's more, saying that such services are
fit punishments for criminals insults both those who perform such
services voluntarily and those whom the services are supposed to
benefit.37 These recurring expressive objections have rendered the
movement for alternative sanctions politically stillborn.3s
But social meaning analysis can enable us to identify not only
which cost-effective alternative sanctions won't be politically ac
ceptable but also which ones will. Shaming punishments - from
bumper stickers for drunk drivers, to publicity for toxic waste
dumpers, to signs or distinctive clothing for sex offenders - unam
biguously express moral disapprobation.39 Accordingly, substitut
ing shaming for imprisonment is unlikely to offend the public
expressive sensibilities that have blocked the conventional alterna
tives. Indeed, the political acceptability of shaming penalties which should be as cost-effective as the conventional alternatives is close to an established fact.40
35. See, e.g., Editorial, Instead ofJail: 'Welcome, Reptile/', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, at
A22 ("[The] impression [of a large fine in lieu of imprisonment for a wealthy tax evader] is
that if you have enough money, you can buy your way out of prison, much as Civil War
conscripts could buy a replacement. Money really counts, the sentence seems to say
");
Md. Wetlands Conviction Stirring Heated Debate, W ASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 1993, at F6 (quoting
prosecutor of environmental crimes stating that "'[p]rison is entirely appropriate in these
cases[;] .
if we just handed out fines it would be regarded simply as a cost of doing
business'").
36. See, e.g., Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Sentencing ofNorth Takes the Easy Way
Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 7, 1989, at 20A ("[Oliver North's community service sen
tence] provides ammunition to those who contend North didn't do much, or even anything,
wrong."); David A. Kaplan & Clara Bingham, A New Era ofPunishment, NEWSWEEK, May
14, 1990, at 50, 51 (quoting the president of Mothers Against Drunk Driving stating that "'By
only giving [a drunk driver convicted of manslaughter] community service, the judge did not
send the right message that this is a violent crime similar to rape and murder"'); cf. United
States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting honorific community
service as a sentence on the ground that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of the[se] as 'punish·
ments' at all").
37. See, e.g., Robert J. Matthews, Letter to the Editor, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 1995, at
A20 ("As a teacher, I find it insulting to my profession that this person, after pleading guilty
to a felony, is going to perform in the capacity of an educator as punishment for his of
fense."); Robert A. Westerberg, Letter to the Editor, Community Service, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., July 22, 1985, at 4 ("Many of us noncriminals perform community service not
to avoid jail but because we want to. Perhaps the bench thinks the inconvenience of not
being able to go after big bucks for a while is fitting punishment for corporate wrongdoers. I
consider community service an honor that should not be tainted by judicial wrist slapping.").
38. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 617-30.
39. See id.
40. See generally Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997, at Al (reporting on the growing use of shaming punishments in Ameri
can criminal law).
•

•

.

•

•

•

·
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Social meaning can also enrich the standard economic view of
deterrence by supplying us with a fuller specification of what moti
vates people to obey or break the law. Imagine we offer an individ
ual an opportunity to exchange a sum of money for a range of
possible sums, some of which are larger and some of which are
smaller than the original sum, but which on average exceed it. If his
goal is to maximize his wealth, we should expect him to accept the
exchange. Whether he will or not, however, will depend on the
form of the exchange: if we structure the transaction to resemble a
wager in a casino game, he is likely to accept it, but if we structure it
to resemble a decision to conceal taxable income, he probably
won't. The meaning of accepting the exchange - that he is a smart
gambler in the one case, a calculating cheater in the other - can
either increase or diminish the value of that behavior.41 The differ
ing significations of tax evasion across cultures can help to explain
why the tax-compliance rate is relatively high in the United States,
where paying one's tax is viewed as an important civic duty, and
relatively low in Europe, where it is not.42
For a practical application, consider the problem of guns in
schools. Authorities often try to discourage this conduct by re
warding students who voluntarily turn in their guns and by severely
punishing those who don't. This carrot-and-stick approach seems
to make economic sense in theory, but is notoriously ineffective in
practice.43
The reason is that it ignores social meaning. Juveniles carry
guns to school because doing so expresses willingness to defy au
thority, a signal that they believe their peers value.44 Far from
counteracting this signal, the carrot-and-stick policy amplifies it: by
demonstrating just how much authorities resent guns, this strategy
reinforces the message of defiance associated with possessing them,
and thus increases the reputational returns from engaging in that
activity.45
A more effective strategy is to pay rewards to students who turn
in gun possessors.46 The fear that their peers will report them
makes students less willing to display their guns; that makes guns
less valuable for conveying information about one's attitude and in
tentions. In addition, the belief that onlookers are willing to sell

41. The results of such an experiment are reported in J.C. Baldry, Tax Evasion ls Not a
Gamble, 22 EcoN. LE"ITERS 333 (1986).
42. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 358.
43. See id. at 363-64.
44. See Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence "Scripts":
The Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent Males, LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoBs., Winter

1996, at 55, 77-84.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 364-65.
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out possessors counteracts the inference that possessors enjoy high
status among their peers.47
D.

Social Influence

"Social influence" is the term that social psychologists use to
describe the propensity of individuals to conform to the behavior
and expectations of others. It's a pervasive phenomenon in social,
economic, and political life.48 Diners prefer to patronize the restau
rants that they think other diners are patronizing.49 Citizens choose
to vote for candidates for whom they know others are voting.so
Teenage girls are more likely to become pregnant when they see
that others are having babies,s1 and adults more likely to commit
suicide when they learn that others have taken their own lives.s2
There are many other examples.s3
Social influence also fuels the decision to commit crimes. Evi
dence of this is plentiful. Juveniles, it has been shown, are much
more likely to commit crimes in groups than individually.s4 Past
neighborhood crime rates explain more of the geographical vari
ance in crime rates than do demographic and law enforcement vari
ables.ss Those arrested for looting and rioting tend to have arrest
records no different from persons in the general population.s6 Peo47. See Fox Butterfield, Police Chiefs Success in Charleston, S.C., Is What's Raising Eye
brows Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, § 1, at 16 (reporting the success of such a policy in
Charleston, South Carolina: "The program has ... reversed the psychology of having a gun
.... 'Before, the more people who knew you had a gun, the greater your prestige
[Now]
[t]he more people who know, the more likely you are to get turned in."' (quoting Reuben
Greenfield chief of police)).
48. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 9, at 352-53.
49. See Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In
fluences on Price, 99 J. POL EcoN. 1109 (1991), reprinted in GARY S.BECKER, AccouNTINO
FOR TASTES 195-97 {1996).
50. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating
Campaigns, 19 AM PoL Ser. REv. 804 {1985).
51. See George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of·Wedlock Childbearing in the
United States, 111 Q.J. EcoN. 277 {1996).
52. See, e.g., David P. Phillips, The Influence of Suggestion on Suicide: Substantive and
Theoretical Implications of the Werther Effect, 39 AM Soc. REv. 340 {1974).
53. See generally Er.i.10T ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13-55 (7th ed. 1995).
54. See Maynard L. Erickson & Gary F.Jensen, "Delinquency ls Still Group Behavior/":
Toward Revitalizing the Group Premise in the Sociology ofDeviance, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI·
NOLOGY 262, 264-65 (1977); see also Fox Butterfield, A Team's Shoplifting Spree Shocks
Quiet Boston Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, § l, at 14 ("[The principal) added that after
carefully questioning all of the students, he had come to believe they really did not under
stand why they had taken part in the [shoplifting spree], except that they were in a group.").
55. See Glaeser et al., supra note 9; Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Albert Lewis Rhodes, The
Distribution ofJuvenile Delinquency in the Social Class Structure, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 720, 72729 {1961).
56. See ROBERT CURVIN & BRUCE PORTER, BLACKOUT LOOTINO! 6-7 (1979); E.L.
Quarantelli & Russell Dynes, Looting in Civil Disorders: An Index of Social Change, in R1.
.
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ple are much more likely to cheat on their taxes when they think
that other individuals are cheating.s1
Like those that abstract from social meaning, theories of deter
rence that abstract from social influence are likely to go wrong,
both descriptively and normatively. The standard economic ac
count, for example, predicts that making the expected penalty more
severe - by increasing either the severity of punishment or the
likelihood of conviction - reduces the level of crime. But the phe
nomenon of social influence reveals that individuals commit crimes
not just because they think crime is a bargain at a particular price,
but also because they think other individuals are committing them.
Consequently, a policy that creates the impression that crime is
widespread can actually increase law breaking, even if that policy
efficiently maintains or even raises the expected penalty for crime.
This conclusion subverts a number of the policy prescriptions
associated with the standard economic view of deterrence. Under
the standard view, for example, it may sometimes seem efficient to
rely more heavily on a severe penalty than on a high probability of
conviction, which requires large investments in law enforcement.58
But because a low probability of apprehension is likely to create the
perception that crime is rampant, social influence effects could
more than offset any efficiency gains from this trade-off.59 The
standard economic view is also sometimes thought to favor policies
that shift the onus of deterrence from the state to potential victims,
who might be in a position to reduce crime through relatively cheap
precautions.6° But barred windows, community watch programs,
and other conspicuous efforts by private citizens to protect them
selves from crime can also convey the message of rampant criminal
ity.61 To avoid this effect, it might make sense for the government
to assume a greater share of the burden in preventing crime than
the standard view suggests is optimal.

OTS AND REBELLION: Crvn. VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 131, 136-37 (Louis H.
Masotti & Don R. Bowen eds., 1968).
57. See FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVA
SION 102-03 (1990); Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire?
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193, 212-13
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
58. See Becker, supra note 1, at 183-84; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1206-07 (1985).
59. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 377-79.
60. See Ben-Shahar & Hare!, supra note 3; Alon Hare!, Efficiency and Fairness in Crimi
nal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1193-97 {1994); Hylton, supra note 3; Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The Eco
nomic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & E coN . 405, 415 {1996); Jan J.M. van Dijk, Under
standing Crime Rates: On the Interactions Between the Rational Choices of Victims and
Offenders, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY DELINQ. & DEVIANT Soc. BEHAV. 105, 114-15 (1994).
61. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 387-89.
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The implications of social influence, however, are not purely
negative; like social organization, moral credibility, and social
meaning, social influence can generate affirmative deterrence strat
egies that are both politically acceptable and morally appealing.
For example, once social influence is taken into account, it becomes
clear that society needn't necessarily raise the price of crime to de
ter it; it can also adopt policies that counteract the perception that
crime is widespread, a strategy that will often be more efficient and
more just than simply raising the severity of punishment.
One such policy is order-maintenance policing. According to
criminologists, the primary cue that crime is tolerated or expected is
visible public disorder.62 When people see aggressive panhandling,
prostitution, public drunkenness, petty drug dealing, and the like,
they think they are in a community that has a crime problem.
When members of the community think they have a crime problem,
they are much more likely to end up with one in fact, because of the
phenomenon of social influence.63 Order-maintenance policing
reverses these effects. When citizens obey norms of orderliness and when authorities visibly respond to those who don't- onlook
ers see that the community is intolerant of criminality. This
message counteracts the inferences that point social influence in the
direction of crime. It also reassures law-abiders, inducing them to
engage in patterns of behavior - including taking to the street at
night- that themselves discourage crime.64 This strategy has been
used with startlingly successful results in New York City.65
Another policy that has shown similar successes is the suppres
sion of open gang activity.66 Gang criminality is driven by social
influence. When juveniles see others openly associating for the
purpose of committing crimes, they understandably perceive that
that's a way of life their peers respect. That perception can make
joining a gang seem worthwhile even to juveniles who are otherwise
only weakly committed or even opposed to gangs. Notwithstanding
their private reservations, moreover, the decision of such individu
als to join gangs conveys publicly that they, too, value gang mem-

62. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990).
63. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MoNTIILY,
Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32.
64.

See Kahan, supra note 9, at 367-73.

65. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDows: RE
STORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OuR CoMMUNmES 108-56 (1996); Debra Living
ston, Police Discretion and the Quality ofLife in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 590, 640, 661 (1997).
66. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 377.
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bership, a signal that reinforces the pressure on other teens to do
the same.67
One way to turn social influence around, then, is to suppress
open gang activity. Some cities, like Chicago, do that with gang
loitering ordinances that specifically authorize the police to break
up public congregations of known gang members.68 Other cities
have achieved the same effect with civil injunctions or with general
youth curfews that they enforce specifically against gang mem
bers.69 By preventing gang members from openly displaying their
authority, these laws counteract the perception that gang members
enjoy a high status in the community. As that perception recedes,
so does the perceived reputational pressure to join gangs. And all
of this happens without the need to resort to severe penalties for
gang-related crime, a tactic that is costly for society, has a dismal
track record, and destroys the communities from which gang mem
bers come.10

II.

KATYAL: MAKING

THE

Vrcrous LEss So

Katyal's approach is of a piece with the new deterrence theo
rizing I've described. His distinctive understanding of substitution
uses complex sociological phenomena to enrich the economic view
of crime, while employing the rigor of economics to tame sociology.
Much of Katyal's account is critical. He convincingly demon
strates how severe punishments can interact with diverse social phe
nomena - from stigma to adaptive preferences - in a manner that
confounds the prescriptions of the standard economic theory of de
terrence.71 These lessons are well worth learning.
I am more interested, however, in mining Katyal's work for pos
itive applications. Unless it can be made to generate politically ap
pealing alternatives to the severe penalties that it criticizes, Katyal's
conception of substitution will be politically inert.
Can Katyal's theory be used to construct a politically feasible set
of alternative deterrence strategies? I think it can; the key lies in
the way in which Katyal's view of substitution constructively reins
in the ambitions of deterrence theory. Deterrence theorists usually
think in binary terms: individuals can behave either viciously or
virtuously, and the point of the law is to make it worth their while
67. See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 50-54 (1964); JAMES F. SHORT, JR. &
FRED L. STRODTBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG DELINQUENCY 75-76 (1965); Gary F.
Jensen, Parents, Peers, and Delinquent Action: A Test ofthe Differential Association Perspec
tive, 78 AM. J. Soc. 562, 565 (1972).
68. See CHICAGO, Iu , MUN. CoDE § 8-4-015 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
69. See Livingston, supra note 65, at 641-42.
70. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 373-77.
71. See Katya!, supra note 12, at 2442-69.
..
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to opt for the latter. Katyal's account of substitution makes us see
why this might often, in practice, be an unrealistic goal; attempts to
coerce people to obey the law can backfire, inducing them to en
gage in even more pernicious forms of criminality.n We are more
likely to succeed, however, if we set our sights on making criminal
offenders choose less, rather than more, harmful species of wrong
doing.73 Once we master the intricacies of Katyal's account, we'll
be able to make the vicious less so even if we can't make them
substitute virtue for vice.
Or at least that is the promise of Katyal's theorizing. In the re
mainder of this essay, I will try to give a sense of the potential util
ity of Katyal's understanding of substitution by speculating about a
number of positive applications of it. Nevertheless, as Katyal him
self recognizes, the main project of translating Katyal's insights into
usable policies remains to be done.
A.

Income Effects: Pornography and Rape

For starters, Katyal's attention to income effects suggests a
counterintuitive justification for raising the severity of punishments
for pornography: namely, that doing so might diminish the income
of men who would consume as much or even more of it as before
but who would as a result be less inclined to engage in rape.
If we want to reduce the incidence of rape, the standard eco
nomic theory of deterrence suggests that we should raise the ex
pected punishment for it. But this approach faces practical
difficulties. Rape is already punished with fairly lengthy prison
terms. Making the punishment for rape even more severe might
thus be difficult and would certainly be costly.74 Moreover, to the
extent that we are able and willing to make prison sentences for
rape substantially more severe, doing so undermines marginal de
terrence: if the punishment for rape were life imprisonment, for
example, then a rapist might be more likely to kill his victim and
any other witnesses, since doing so would expose him to relatively
little additional punishment (particularly in states without the death
penalty) while reducing the likelihood that he would be convicted
of the rape.
If we accept Katyal's account of income effects, however, then
an alternative to increasing the penalty for rape would be to raise
the expected punishment for possession of hard-core pornography,
conduct that is substantially underregulated under existing obscen72.

See id. at 2389-401.
73. See id. at 2429-30, 2463.
74. Punishing rape with the death penalty is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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ity laws.75 Assume, as seems to be the case, that men who rape are
likely to be avid consumers of pornography.76 Assume further, as
also seems to be the case, that for many men pornography is addic
tive77 - that is that the demand for pornography is relatively in
elastic relative to its price (including the expected punishment for
possessing it). If this is so, then we might expect increasing the ex
pected punishment for pornography to reduce the incidence of rape
through what Katyal calls a "Y-optimality" effect: as the expected
penalty for pornography goes up, consumption of it diminishes por
nography addicts' "income" (i.e., the tolerance for risk of criminal
punishment); those of them who happen to be rapists have less in
come (in that sense) to expend on the even-more-costly offense of
rape and thus commit that crime less frequently. Indeed, it's even
possible, under these circumstances, that pornography addicts will
plow the "income" saved from forgone rapes back into the con
sumption of pornography, in which case pornography would, for
these men, exhibit the characteristics of a Giffen good. Thus, rais
ing the price of pornography won't make the consumers of it virtu
ous - on the contrary, they consume just as much and possibly
even more of it; but it will make them less vicious, insofar as they
will rape less frequently.
This account confounds the conventional arguments about the
wisdom of punishing the use of pornography. To the extent that
pornography and rape are substitutes for each other, the standard
economic view counsels against raising the expected punishment for
use of pornography. As the expected punishment for using pornog
raphy increases, the marginal punishment for rape goes down,
which we should expect to increase the incidence of rape to some
75. See 1 ArroRNEY GENERAL'S CoMMN. ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 366-72
(1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (noting the underenforcement of existing obscenity laws,
which would apply to most hard-core pornography). The mere possession of obscene matter
in the home is, of course, constitutionally protected. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969). However, obtaining obscenity - even through mail order placed from the home or
through a home modem, not to mention through a commercial transaction outside the home
- is not constitutionally protected. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996); see also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141 (1973)
(holding that the constitutional right to home possession of obscenity does not entail "a cor
relative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it"). Consequently, strictly enforcing
existing laws against the distribution of obscene materials would expose the vast majority of
hard-core pornography consumers (i.e., all of those who obtain their pornography from
others rather than making it themselves) to criminal penalties.
76. See, e.g., DENNIS Howrrr & GUY CuMBERBATCH, PORNOGRAPHY: IMPACTS AND IN
FLUENCES 43 (1990) (reviewing social science evidence that sex offenders display greater use

of pornography than do nonoffenders); W.L. Marshall, The Use of Sexually Explicit Stimuli
by Rapists, Child Molesters, and Nonoffenders, 25 J. SEX REs. 267, 279 tbl. 2 (1988) (finding
that 83% of rapists as opposed to 29% of nonoffenders consume hard-core pornography).
77. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 77 (comments of Commissioner Dobson);
David Mura, A Male Grief: Notes on Pornography and Addiction, in MEN CONFRONT POR
NOGRAPHY 123 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1990).
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degree. Indeed, if we wish to reduce the incidence of rape, we
should make the price of (including the expected punishment for)
using pornography lower, which should induce at least some poten
tial rapists to substitute pornography (along with activities such as
masturbation) for rape.78 What this account overlooks, Katyal's
theory implies, is how the potential income effects associated with
changing the price of pornography might well dominate the hypoth
esized substitution effects.
According to the feminist critique of pornography, the standard
economic view overlooks something else: the preference-shaping
effects of pornography. This account holds that exposure to por
nography creates an appetite for rape (or, to the same effect,
reduces inhibitions against it).79 If that's so, then the preference
shaping effect might dominate the substitution effect when we
lower the price of (including, again, pllnishment for) pornography
relative to rape, and thus still produce a net increase in rapes. On
this account, it makes sense to raise the price of pornography in
order to reduce consumption of it and thereby dampen the appetite
for rape.
Katyal's theory, as I've adapted it, takes issue with the feminist
position as well. The income-effects argument supports raising the
price of pornography not because doing so will reduce consumption
of pornography - indeed, it could even increase it - but because
doing so will reduce the inclination of those consuming pornogra
phy to hazard the penalty for rape. Because they end up in the
same place - increased penalties for pornography - it might not
seem to matter which mechanism - Katyal's or the feminists' explains the reduced incidence of rape. But insofar as there is rea
son to doubt the preference-shaping mechanism as an empirical
matter, Katyal's income-effects argument strengthens the case for
regulating pornography as a means of reducing sexual violence. For
Katyal's income-effects argument works even if, as many have spec
ulated,80 the correlation between consumption of pornography and
commission of rape is the product of some unidentified third
cause.81
78. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON 366·67 (1992) (hypothesizing
this and other possible effects).
79. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF TIIE STATE 13845 (1989). See generally Diana E.H. Russell, Pornography and Rape: A Causal Model, 9
PoL. PsYCHOL. 41 (1988) (surveying empirical and experimental research on this effect).
80. See POSNER, supra note 78, at 367-71.
81. Another possibility is that the preference-shaping mechanism and the income·effects
mechanism will reinforce each other as the expected punishment for using pornography in
creases: men who aren't addicted to pornography will consume less and thus be less stimu
lated to rape by exposure to pornography; men who are addicted to pornography will
consume as much or more of it but be discouraged from raping by reduced "income."
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Of course, this adaptation of Katyal's position remains subject
to significant empirical questions. It assumes, for one thing, that
potential rapists' demand for pornography exhibits less elasticity
(and thus less responsiveness to increased punishment) than does
their demand for rape. If we believe that men are more likely to be
addicted to pornography than to rape, then that's a plausible as
sumption, but it's still no more than that.
Katyal's account of "Y-optimality" and Giffen goods also as
sumes something a good deal less intuitive, namely, that income ef
fects will constrain the commission of diverse nonmarket crimes.
It's pretty easy to see how raising the market price of a commodity
- whether an automobile or an illicit drug - reduces the power of
a person who buys it to purchase other commodities: after paying
the higher price for one commodity, the individual has less money
to buy others. But it's less easy to see how income effects constrain
the commission of nonmarket crimes - for example, rape, arson,
robbery, and other offenses that don't involve cash transactions once the expected punishment of one goes up; for that to be so, we
have to imagine that the willingness of individuals to commit crimes
is constrained by a generic tolerance for expected punishment, such
that if we raise the expected punishment for one crime, an individ
ual offender will have less of that tolerance available to expend on
other crimes. Maybe criminals behave as if they were buying
crimes on a fixed punishment-risk budget, but it's not obvious that
they do.
Nevertheless, I don't regard these sorts of empirical doubts as
decisive. Given the potential returns from Katyal's ingenious adap
tation of "income effects" to criminal-law policy, his account is at
least plausible enough to justify further study and experimentation.
B.

Extremeness Aversion: Guns in Schools and Alternative
Sanctions

One of the most intriguing but also least developed proposals in
Katyal's article is that the law should exploit the phenomenon of
extremeness aversion.82 In many real-world settings, society has a
decided preference between two forms of misconduct that seem to
compete with each other on more-or-less even terms in the minds
of criminals. The way to influence criminals to choose the less
harmful crime, Katyal argues, is to "construct" third options that
are preferable to neither form of misconduct but that nevertheless
induce criminals to revise upward their valuation of the socially pre
ferred form, which now strikes them as a sensible "middle ground"
between extremes.
82. See Katya!, supra note 12, at 2463.
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The question, though, is whether we are sufficiently sophisti
cated about how to construct these magic third options. Reconsider
the case of guns in schools. Students might view knives and guns as
relatively clear substitutes: knives have less panache, but guns are
more expensive and subject their possessors to bigger penalties.
Society, of course, strongly prefers that students arm themselves
with knives. Can society construct a third option that induces stu
dents to view knives as a sensible "middle option"? Could we in
duce students to frame their options this way by reducing, or even
eliminating, the punishment for possession of brass knuckles, box
cutters, or mace? I doubt it. Maybe other plausible third-option
candidates exist, but identifying them in this context, and in others,
calls for close collaboration between law enforcement officials and
street-wise administrators.
One setting in which I can more readily imagine Katyal's in
sights on extremeness aversion having some application, however,
is that of alternative sanctions. Fines, as I've emphasized, are a po
litically unacceptable alternative to imprisonment for expressive
reasons: they seem to say that society is pricing rather than con
demning the wrongdoer's conduct.s3 The social meaning of fines,
however, is constructed at least in part by the availability of impris
onment itself: fines seem to express moral ambivalence precisely
because imprisonment condemns so unequivocally. Katyal's em
phasis on extremeness aversion suggests that if we alter the frame
of reference by adding a third sanction that condemns even less
forcefully we might be able to induce the public to view criminal
fines as sufficiently expressive to be acceptable.

Prosecutorial diversion might work for this purpose. Under this
practice, the prosecutor agrees to dismiss or to refrain from filing
criminal charges in exchange for a monetary payment.84 Since the
whole point of diversion is to give the offender a chance to buy his
way out of the stigma associated with a criminal conviction, this
disposition seems even more vulnerable than an ordinary fine to
being interpreted as a mere "pricing" mechanism. It seems clear
for this reason that prosecutorial diversion - which is in fact quite
common in Europe85 - wouldn't be politically acceptable as an al
ternative to imprisonment in America. But Katyal's argument sug
gests that diversion needn't be politically acceptable on its own in
order to be a useful addition to the inventory of alternative sanc
tions. For even if it were almost never employed, the existence of
the diversion option might enhance the political acceptability of or83. See supra text accompanying note 35.
See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, in 20 CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 128 (Michael Tonry ed., 1996).
85. See id. at 128-29.
84.
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dinary fines: when framed only with imprisonment, fines seem ex
pressively ambiguous; but when framed with imprisonment and
diversion, they might appear at least moderately condemnatory.
And moderation might be enough to satisfy the public appetite for
condemnation given the phenomenon of extremeness aversion.
In any event, seeing whether diversion would have this effect on
the political acceptability of fines seems like a worthwhile experi
ment. Whether politically self-interested legislators and prosecu
tors can be persuaded to set the experiment up, of course, is
another question.
C.

Income Effects: Heroin

vs.

Crack

A final example of how Katyal's insights can be used to gener
ate affirmative prescriptions is one that he himself would reject: the
substitution of heroin for crack. While Katyal suggests that it's
worse for drug users to consume heroin,s6 many would dispute this
characterization. Among them would be most African-American
residents of the inner city, who view crack as uniquely destructive
of their communities.s1 Most law-enforcement officials would like
wise disagree with the proposition that society is better off when
drug users take crack; indeed, some attribute part of New York
City's recent crime drop to the resurgent popularity of heroin,
which, unlike crack, is alleged to dissipate aggression and hence
lessen addicts' criminal propensities.ss
So what Katyal describes as an unintended policy misfire namely, greater consumption of heroin in the wake of dramatically
increased penalties for crack - might be better described as a for
tuitous policy success. Could the same result have been achieved in
a less costly or severe manner? Katyal's reasoning suggests that
merely lowering the price of heroin - by, say, reducing the ex
pected penalty for distributing it - would likely have induced some
crack users to substitute heroin. But such a policy presumably also
would have had the undesirable consequence of increasing demand
for heroin among noncrack users. Raising the price of heroin (by
increasing the expected penalty) presumably wouldn't have done
that, but it still might have stimulated substitution of heroin for
crack, Katyal's account implies,s9 because of a Giffen goods effect.
If so, and if that result could have been achieved by raising the pen
alty for heroin only a modest amount, then perhaps that policy
86. See Katya!, supra note 12, at 2406, 2462.
See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Mystery of New York, the Suddenly Safer City, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1995, § 4, at 1.
89. See Katya!, supra note 12, at 2435-38.
87.
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would have been better - from both an economic perspective and
a moral one - than was the policy of increasing crack penalties so
dramatically.
Assuming these speculations are grounded in empirical fact, the
substitution of heroin for crack - by whatever mechanism - dra
matically illustrates the moral consequences of Katyal's general way
of thinking. The object of the substitution strategy isn't to win the
war on drugs but only to contain the enemy within territory that we
are willing to cede. Indeed, there's something almost demoralizing
about saying that the object of our anticrack policy is to increase
heroin addiction. But if that's the most effective way to limit the
scourge of crack, then maybe we should be willing to settle - as
Katyal implies we should - for making the vicious less so.
CONCLUSION
The concept of deterrence means different things to different
people. To some, including many politicians, it is essentially a
buzzword: by advocating it, one signals one's commitment to a cer
tain style of response to the frightening needs and demands of the
impoverished. To others, including many academics, it is an intel
lectual abstraction: deterrence is a puzzle to be solved by formal
modeling, or a foil to be battered to prove that some other abstract
"theory" supplies the "truth" about criminal law. For still others,
including many ordinary citizens, deterrence is a disguise to obscure
- from others and even from themselves - the contentious evalu
ative judgments that underlie their positions on issues like the death
penalty and gun control.
The question that I've tried to address in this essay is whether
deterrence can also be a practical framework for those who want to
solve America's crime problems on morally acceptable terms. It
certainly ought to be. Crime threatens the welfare not only of those
who are victimized by it, but of whole communities, whose mem
bers' life prospects are foreshortened by the destructive impact of
crime on the institutions that instill the capacities of productive citi
zenship. Deterring crime should therefore be regarded as a pri
mary aim of social welfare policy.
But it can't be so conceived against the background of the pre
vailing economic and sociological understandings of crime control.
The former's strategies for "raising the price" of crime are far too
costly, both morally and economically. The latter's focus on ending
inequality is so politically infeasible that advocating it is tantamount
to withdrawing entirely from public deliberations on crime.
The task for the next generation of deterrence theorists is to
identify morally and politically acceptable law-enforcement strate
gies that themselves ameliorate the social conditions that cause
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crime. The works I've discussed in this essay, including the ex
tremely important article of Neal Katyal, represent the first concep
tual steps in that direction. But many more such steps must be
taken before deterrence theory arrives at a viable middle ground
between economics and sociology.

